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KEEPING ATTORNEYS FROM TRASHING IDENTITIES:
MALPRACTICE AS BACKSTOP PROTECTION FOR
CLIENTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE'S POLICY ON ELECTRONIC COURT
RECORDS
Michael Caughey
Abstract: Federal courts in the United States have embraced electronic access to court
records because it promises to allow courts to run more efficiently. At the same time, critics
worry that electronically available court records might provide identity thieves with a trove
of clients' personal information. The United States Judicial Conference has adopted a policy
endorsing electronic access to court records, but the policy does not contain an express
enforcement mechanism to protect clients' privacy. While court-directed protections, such as
Rule I 1 sanctions, might help prevent identity theft, they will not help clients after the crime
occurs. To recover their losses from identity theft, clients might seek recovery from the
attorneys who caused their losses by failing to redact their personal information from court
filings. This Comment proposes that clients use the Judicial Conference's policy as evidence
of their attorneys' duty to redact and demonstrates how clients can prove that their attorneys'
failure to redact was the proximate cause of their losses resulting from identity theft.
Fueled by the rapidly increasing availability of private information,
identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes in America.' In an
ironic twist, by making court filings available electronically, the federal
court system may be unwittingly facilitating identity theft. 2 In 2001, the
1. See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT (Sept.
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO3/O9/synovatereport.pdf 5 (noting that 12.7% of
national survey participants reported being victims of identity theft in the past five years); see also
FED. TRADE COMM'N (FTC), FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT
PROGRAM OCTOBER 1998-SEPTEMBER 2003 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/timelinereport.pdf 7 (noting an increase in reported cases of identity
theft from 1,380 in 1999, to a projected 210,000 in 2003); FTC, ID THEFT: WHEN BAD THINGS
HAPPEN TO YOUR GOOD NAME 1-2 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.pdf [hereinafter ID THEFT]; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY FRAUD: INFORMATION ON PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET
IMPACT IS LIMITED 40-45 (May 1998), GAO/GGD-98-IOOBR, available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98100b.pdf.
2. See Kate Marquess, Open Court?: As Courthouses Rush To Put Filing Online, Easy Access to
Legal Documents Has Many Worrying About Privacy Rights I (May 23, 2002), at
http://www.courtaccess.org/states/ny/documents/open%20court.pdf (discussing how information
now travels from the court "by Internet, instead of by mail or on foot"); see also About CM/ECF, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003) (discussing the filing
of documents electronically without going to the courthouse); Public Access to Court Electronic
Records: Overview, at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003)
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Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files
(Judicial Conference Committee) officially recommended that civil
records3 in United States district courts be made available electronically,
with limited exceptions, "to the same extent they are available at the
courthouse."4
The Judicial Conference Committee hailed electronic access to court
documents as a means to improve the efficiency of court operations.5
However, critics of electronic access have argued that imaged case files
will place clients' personal information in the hands of identity thieves.6
Responding to these concerns, the Judicial Conference Committee
adopted a national policy (Policy) establishing basic guidelines for
district courts to follow in determining what documents can be posted
electronically and how district courts should protect private information
contained within them.7  The Judicial Conference Committee
supplemented the Policy with a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
publication designed to answer common questions from court clerks and
the bar. 8 Both federal district courts in Washington State have adopted
(discussing process whereby court records can now be viewed remotely through electronic access);
infra note 6 and accompanying text.
3. The Judicial Conference Committee's recommendation also discussed bankruptcy, social
security, and criminal cases. The main topic of the recommendation involved civil cases, however,
and this Comment focuses only upon civil cases. See U.S JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT ON
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES, at
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter POLICY].
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See ELIZABETH BACON EHLERS ET AL., BUSINESS, LAW AND THE INTERNET: ESSENTIAL
GUIDANCE FOR YOU, YOUR CLIENTS, AND YOUR FIRM § 3.13 (2002); Peter C. Alexander & Kelly
Jo Slone, Thinking About the Private Matters in Public Documents. Bankruptcy Privacy in an
Electronic Age, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 437-39 (2001); Janine Benner et al., Nowhere To Turn:
Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm (May
2000); Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/onlinepubrecs.htm (Apr. 19, 2002); Marquess, supra note 2, at 1.
7. POLICY, supra note 3.
8. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
Frequently Asked Questions on the Judicial Conference Privacy Policy on Public Access to
Electronic Case Files, at 1, attached to IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE POLICY ON
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (Informational Memorandum) (Mar. 29,
2002) (on file with the author) [hereinafter FAQ].
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the Policy's recommendations on how to protect clients' privacy without
expanding or elaborating on the recommendations.
9
One of the Policy's key provisions requires attorneys to redact their
clients' private information from all court filings-paper or electronic. 10
Yet, the Policy contains no mechanism clients can use to enforce this
requirement." Therefore, clients may have to rely on Washington's legal
malpractice cause of action to make this new duty meaningful. By suing
their attorneys for malpractice, clients can shift their losses back to their
attorneys, who were responsible for releasing the clients' private
information.
This Comment explores the sudden rise of electronic access to federal
court records and argues that clients can successfully sue their attorneys
for malpractice when they lose their identities due to their attorneys'
failure to redact the clients' personal information from court filings. Part
I outlines the scope of the public's right to access court records, the
federal judiciary's decision to allow electronic access to those records,
and the growing crime of identity theft. Part II explains how the Policy
attempts to manage electronic access to court records. Part III examines
two elements of a malpractice claim under Washington law: breach of
duty and proximate causation. Part IV argues that Washington courts
should allow client-plaintiffs to introduce the Policy as evidence of their
attorneys' specific duty to redact sensitive personal information from
federal court filings. Part IV also argues that attorneys' failure to redact
is the proximate cause of their clients' losses resulting from stolen
identities in situations where the thief obtained the client's information
from the unredacted court filings. Finally, Part IV argues that the
criminal act of identity theft is not a superseding cause of clients' losses.
9. The Eastern District of Washington has adopted all the substantive provisions of the Policy,
though in a slightly different form. See In re Electronic Availability of Case File Information in
Civil Cases, Except Social Security Cases, General Order No. 100-02-01 (E.D. Wash. 2002)
[hereafter General Order]; Notice of Electronic Availability of Case File Information (Apr. 2003),
available at http://www.waed.uscourts.gov/attomey/public access.pdf. The Western District of
Washington has also sought to implement the Policy through a general order. See Frequently Asked
Questions: Are There Any Things That Should Not Be Filed Electronically?, at
http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/wawd/cm-ecf.nsf/main/page (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (stating
that the Western District of Washington requires sensitive information be redacted pursuant to a
general order adopted on May 29, 2003).
10. See POLICY, supra note 3.
11. See id.
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I. ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO CASE FILES ENDANGERS
LITIGANTS' IDENTITIES
Courts in the United States recognize that the public has a right to
access court records. 12 This right can be limited, however, when the
public requests a form of access that might lead to improper use of the
information contained in the court records. 13 The Policy reflects the
federal courts' decision to allow electronic access to court records.
14
Although this access may be more expansive than the law requires, it
could greatly improve the efficiency of court operations.15 While
electronic access to court records has its benefits, critics have raised
concerns that such access could facilitate theft of clients' identities.
1 6
A. The Public Has a Right To Access Court Documents, But Not
Necessarily To Do So Electronically
There is a strong tradition in the United States of allowing expansive
public access to court records, including all official case filings and
exhibits admitted at trial. 17 Courts have rejected even arguably admirable
attempts to protect the privacy of victims of violent crimes like rape.1 8
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts may limit the
12. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); POLICY, supra note 3.
13. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
14. See POLICY, supra note 3.
15. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); Exparte
Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407 (1894) (noting that "any attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the
records of the court, would seem to be inconsistent with the common understanding of what belongs
to a public court of record"). But cf Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33-34 n.19 (1984)
(discussing the traditional common law understanding that items not filed during a case were not
subject to public disclosure and that trial courts historically exercised control over access to
courthouse records). American courts long ago rejected the English practice of requiring the public
to demonstrate a legitimate interest before accessing court records. See Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. at
406-07. But see In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (denying access which is sought simply
out of mere curiosity or to create a scandal). This reaction was motivated by the court's concerns
that once the right to access court records was subjected to judicial scrutiny, a Pandora's box of
limitations could evolve. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-81 (1980)
(discussing corollary right to access in the context of criminal trials).
18. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495.
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form of access to court records where "court files might have become a
vehicle for improper purposes."'
' 9
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,20 the Court recognized a
crucial distinction between the right to access and the form of access.
21
In Nixon, the Court held that the trial court properly limited the public's
access to paper transcripts of tapes containing the voice of President
Nixon that had been admitted into evidence as part of the Watergate
22criminal prosecution. The Court decided that a paper transcript of the
tapes, rather than copies of the tapes themselves, would allow the public
access to the actual information contained in the tapes, yet minimize the
likelihood that the tapes would be put to improper commercial or
spiteful uses.23 Under Nixon, then, courts may regulate the form of
access to court records when one particular form of access is less likely
to result in improper usage of the records than another.24
Congress has encouraged federal courts to make case files available
electronically, 25 but it has not mandated any specific level or means of
electronic access. 26 Furthermore, while Congress has directed the U.S.
Supreme Court to adopt rules of civil procedure to address electronic
access, it has not imposed a specific time requirement on the Court.
27
Nevertheless, in 2001, the federal court system's Judicial Conference
19. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (listing improper purposes). While identity theft was not listed as an
improper purpose, the Court included actions such as use out of spite or for commercial gain,
neither of which is inherently criminal. Id.
20. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
21. See id. at 609.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 603.
24. See id. at 603-09.
25. Congress has not required the federal courts to provide electronic access, but has indirectly
approved the practice by authorizing the Judicial Conference Committee to establish user fees for
the service. See Chronology of the Federal Judiciary's Electronic Public Access (EPA) Program,
available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/epachron.pdf I (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
Some uncertainty remains as to whether the courts, the legislature, or both will be responsible for
managing electronic access. See In Depth: Privacy and Electronic Access to Court Files, E-FILING
REPORT, I No. 2 c-Filing Rep. 14 (Jan. 2001).
26. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913-15.
Congress has only required that the courts post paper filings if the courts scan those documents
electronically; if the courts choose not to scan the documents, they are not required to post them.
Congress has also directed the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt rules of civil procedure designed to
protect privacy concerns. Congress did not dictate what the new rules should look like or when they
must be completed. See id.
27. See id.
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Committee decided to encourage district courts to make court documents
available electronically.28
The Judicial Conference Committee decided to embrace an Internet
database method of access that provides the public with the same scope
of electronic access as that available at the courthouse. 29 It based this
decision largely on the theory that courts will function more efficiently if
they provide increased accessibility for members of the public and
lawyers who are not in close proximity to the courthouse, reducing the
workload in clerks' offices. 30 To achieve this efficiency, the Committee
envisioned a nationwide system providing extensive access. 31
Having decided to make court records available electronically, the
Judicial Conference Committee placed only nominal limits on who can
electronically access those documents.32 Court records are available
through the federal courts' official Public Access to Court Electronic
Records system (PACER).33 PACER is an Internet-based database
accessible virtually world-wide. 34 The system requires users to input a
password to log onto PACER, but almost anyone can obtain a password
within a few weeks by request.35 The password requirement is designed
to create an electronic trail, which the PACER administrators can trace if
a problem arises to determine who accessed specific information.36 Each
district court maintains its own PACER database. While practices vary
among the districts, fifty-eight districts allow PACER users to view
filings that have been electronically scanned.37 The PACER system then
compiles limited information about each civil case, including party




32. See id. The requirement that the public first obtain a password appears to be the only limit
upon access under the Policy. See id.
33. See id.; see also PACER, at http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
34. While the primary means of access is now Internet based, a direct dial-in version is also
available for those without Internet access. See PACER, supra note 33.
35. See id. (explaining that there is no cost to register for the PACER password, and the official
registration form only requires users to provide a name and address to which the password can be
mailed).
36. See POLICY, supra note 3. The ability to trace a user is of course dependant on the user having
submitted truthful information on their registration form.
37. See PACER Web Links, at http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/links.pl (last visited
Nov. 4, 2003). Districts that do not yet scan documents generally provide some alternative
information, often in the form of the docket information. Id.
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names and the subject of each case, into a national database called the
U.S. Party Case Index, which is accessible with the same password.38
This compilation enables nationwide searches for specific kinds of cases
across all local PACER systems.39
B. Court Records Contain All of the Information Necessary To Steal
an Identity
Critics quickly vocalized their concerns about litigants' privacy
following the Judicial Conference Committee's decision to allow
electronic access to court records. 40 The most widespread concern was
that criminals would be able to use information contained in court
records to steal clients' identities.41 Identity theft is one of the fastest
growing crimes in America,42 and several commentators have warned
that an official case file includes everything needed to steal an identity.43
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), all that is needed to
steal an individual's identity is that person's Social Security number,
date of birth, and financial account numbers.44 The U.S. Party Case
Index has simplified access to this information by permitting searches by
claim type. 45 A thief need only determine which type of claim would
most likely require filings containing the information necessary to steal
an identity and conduct such a search.
The consequences of identity theft can be extensive and take on a
variety of forms. Victims of identity theft often spend substantial time
and money attempting to get creditors to institutionalize victims'
losses.46 The average victim suffers $4,800 to $10,200 in losses from
38. See U.S. Party Case Index Overview, at http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/uspci.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2003) (describing the U.S. Party Case Index).
39. See id.
40. See Alexander & Slone, supra note 6, at 438; Givens, supra note 6 (noting situation where a
singles club accessed divorce records to find marketing targets).
41. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3.13; Givens, supra note 6.
42. See supra note I and accompanying text.
43. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 6; at § 3.13; Givens, supra note 6.
44. See ID THEFT, supra note 1, at 1.
45. See Nature of Suit, at http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/natsuit.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2003); U.S. Party Case Index Overview, supra note 38. For example, by entering code 371 into the
system to search for Truth in Lending cases, thieves might expect to find more relevant personal and
financial data than if they entered code 720 for Labor/Management Relations or searched broadly
under all case types.
46. See Christopher P. Couch, Comment, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and
Consumers: Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REv. 583, 586 (2002) (citing
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identity theft, and spends thirty to sixty hours resolving the matter.47
Additionally, many victims of identity theft experience substantial
indirect costs. 48 These indirect costs include medical expenses for
treating theft-induced stress, sleeplessness, and severe depression.49
II. FEDERAL COURT POLICY REGULATES THE POSTING
AND FORMATTING OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
When it decided to make electronic court records available
electronically, the Judicial Conference Committee proposed a model
Policy to be adopted by individual district courts.50 Many federal district
courts, including both Washington State districts, have adopted this
Policy. 51 The Policy acknowledges concerns about the risks to litigants'
privacy and attempts to provide a uniform national framework for
balancing those risks with the benefits of increased access to court
records.52 Any privacy concerns, however, are tempered by the fact that
courts using the PACER system have reported few problems with it thus
FTC, Identity Theft Complaint Data: Figures and Trends on Identity Theft January 2000 Through
December 2000 4-5, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/trends-update 2000.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2003)).
47. See FTC-IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. Because of various methods
to shift the loss back to creditors, individuals on average pay between $500 and $1,200 of the loss
from their personal resources. The out-of-pocket cost differs depending on whether the crime is the
misuse of an existing account or the opening of a new account. Id. The legal rights of creditors and a
client's possible contributory responsibility for failing to minimize losses are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
48. See IDENTITY FRAUD: INFORMATION ON PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET IMPACT IS
LIMITED, supra note 1, at 49; Couch, supra note 46, at 585-86.
49. See Couch, supra note 46, at 586.
50. See POLICY, supra note 3.
51. See supra note 9. Determining the actual number of districts following the Policy is difficult
because many districts have adopted the Policy without clearly disclosing their written orders. See
supra note 9. For examples from districts in other states, see General Order No. 53: Privacy (N.D.
Cal. 2002), available at https://ecf'cand.uscourts.gov/cand/docs/rules-orders.htm; In re Adopting a
Policy on Sensitive Information and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Standing Order No. 02-
01 (N.D. Ga. 2002), available at
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/documents/StandingOrder 02 01 .pdf; In re Privacy Policy
Regarding Public Access to Electronic Case Files, Joint General Order WD No. 03-01 & ED No.
03-01 (W.D. Ky. & E.D. Ky. 2003), available at
http://www.kyed.uscourts.gov/rules/privacyorder.pdf; Privacy Policy and Information Availability
Notice of the District of New Mexico (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/web/Shared%20Files/privpol.htm; Administrative Procedures for
Electronic Case Filing, General Order No. 22 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003), available at
http:/,/www.nynd.uscourts.gov/pdf/genorder/go22.pdf.
52. See POLICY, supra note 3.
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far.53 Despite this good news, the Policy addresses the continuing risks
posed by electronic access by (1) limiting the kind of documents that are
available electronically, (2) proposing that trial courts seal certain
documents from electronic access, (3) suggesting that trial courts impose
Rule 11 sanctions to punish attorneys who use electronic access as a
means to maliciously reveal opposing litigants' private information, and
(4) requiring attorneys to redact four kinds of information about their
clients.54
A. The Policy's Definition of Case File Limits the Kind of Documents
Accessible Electronically
The Policy's first means of preventing identity theft is its definition of
"case file," which determines what kinds of documents will be made
available electronically. Only items considered part of the case file are
subject to imaging and uploading onto PACER.55 The Policy defines
case file broadly to encompass most litigation-related documents that
have traditionally been available at the courthouse.56 This definition
includes documents submitted by the parties, those created by the court,
and transcripts of oral proceedings.57 However, the Policy's definition
does not include information such as non-filed discovery materials, trial
exhibits not admitted into evidence, and drafts or notes produced by the
court.58 This definition of case file protects private information by
keeping most sensitive information contained in voluminous discovery
59
materials out of public view.
53. See id. This conclusion was reached based on an evaluation prior to the advent of widespread
imaging by district courts, and its prospective value may be questionable.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.; Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (noting that "pretrial
depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial," and that "[s]uch
proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in general, they are conducted in
private as a matter of modem practice") (citations omitted).
57. See POLICY, supra note 3.
58. See id.
59. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 33.
Washington Law Review
B. The Policy Proposes That Judges Seal Files on Request
The Policy also proposes that trial judges use their supervisory power
over court records to seal certain documents from electronic access.60
Before the court will order a file sealed, it must make an affirmative
finding, usually upon the request of a party, that the file contains
information that should not be available to the public. 6' Clerk's offices
are not required to review filings for sensitive information; it is solely
the responsibility of attorneys to review documents for compliance with
the Policy.62 Therefore, courts are unlikely to order files sealed if
attorneys, unaware of their obligation to protect clients' personal
information, fail to raise the matter with the court.
C. The Policy Recommends That Courts Sanction Attorneys Who
Maliciously Endanger Opposing Parties' Identities
The Policy also recommends that courts use Rule 11 sanctions to
protect clients.63 As with the protection offered by sealing documents,
the potential protection provided by Rule 11 sanctions largely depends
upon attorneys paying attention to the documents filed by both sides.
64
Attorneys who actively review the opposition's filings will be in a
position to inform the court when opposing counsel maliciously files
documents containing their clients' personal information. 65 Less diligent
attorneys may not notice when opposing counsel files documents that
contain their clients' personal information until it is too late to prevent
60. See POLICY, supra note 3. The Policy is not clear on what authority or standard exists for the
recommended sealing of documents, nor is it clear on whether both the electronic and paper
versions will be sealed or just the electronic. Id.; see also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-347, § 205(c)(3)(iv), 116 Stat. 2899, 2914 (requiring that if the U.S. Supreme Court's eventual
rules for electronic documents permit the redaction of information, parties be allowed to file
unredacted copies under seal with the court).
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (describing the procedure for obtaining protective orders). Because
there are currently no standards under the Policy, courts will likely have to rely on the traditional
approach under Rule 26(c).
62. See FAQ, supra note 8, at 2.
63. See POLICY, supra note 3. The Judicial Conference Committee, while acknowledging privacy
concerns, declined to recommend the adoption of a new rule of civil procedure designed to address
the topic. See id. The Committee rejected a formal rule of procedure because adopting such a rule
would take several years and privacy concerns needed immediate attention. See id.
64. FAQ, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that clerk's offices will not review documents).
65. Because the court and the clerk's office are not responsible for reviewing filed documents the
attorney has the sole responsibility to monitor what is filed and take appropriate action. See id.
416
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that information from falling into the wrong hands. 66 Rule 1 1 sanctions,
however, are a limited remedy because courts traditionally have been
reluctant to impose them in the absence of some action by an attorney
clearly warranting judicial sanction.67
D. The Policy Requires That Attorneys Redact Sensitive Information
from Their Case Filings
Finally, the Policy requires that "counsel and pro se litigants" redact,
omit, or modify sensitive information from the documents they file with
the court. 68 There are four types of sensitive information expressly
covered by the Policy: (1) Social Security numbers, (2) dates of birth, (3)
financial account numbers, and (4) names of minor children. 69 This
protection places the burden of protecting clients squarely on the party
making the actual filing, usually an attorney, and does not require courts
to take any specific action.70 Under the Policy, attorneys must "inform
their clients that case files may be obtained electronically and ensure
private information is not included in the case files."'" In placing this
responsibility on attorneys, the Policy recognizes that "[m]embers of the
bar must be educated about the [Policy] and the fact that they must
protect their clients. 72 Washington's federal district courts have heeded
this call and taken steps to ensure that the bar is aware of its new duty.73
66. Whether an attorney's failure to move to seal or seek Rule II sanctions related to an
adversary's filing would support a malpractice claim is beyond the scope of this Comment.
67. See Conn v. CSO Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Rule 1 I is an
extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.") (citation omitted); Operating
Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that Rule 11 is
reserved for "rare and exceptional case[s]"). Because courts have the alternative option to correct
the problem by sealing the filing, they may be reluctant to punish attorneys in most situations
resulting from simple carelessness.
68. See POLICY, supra note 3. Hereafter, this Comment uses the term "redaction" to represent all
three methods of protecting information. The redaction provision of the Policy applies to all
documents filed with the courts. See FAQ, supra note 8, at 3. Some district courts such as the
Eastern District of Washington have used slightly stronger language like "shall refrain from
including, or shall redact" (emphasis added) in their general orders. See General Order, supra note
9.
69. See POLICY, supra note 3.
70. See FAQ, supra note 8, at 2.
71. Id.
72. POLICY, supra note 3.
73. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the Policy primarily places the responsibility of protecting
litigants on the judges and attorneys who must develop the actual means
for adapting existing procedures to the new electronic reality. The only
procedural adaptation the Policy undertakes is its extension of the
traditional understanding of what constitutes an official case file.74 The
definition of case file continues the federal courts' tradition of keeping
certain types of information out of the public eye, but it does not
decrease the amount of information available to the public. 75 While the
Policy suggests three means by which courts and attorneys can protect
litigants' identities, it does not itself create a new cause of action for
litigants.76 Thus, the Policy does not expressly provide clients a means of
enforcing one of its central protections: the attorney's duty to redact the
client's personal information before filing documents with the court.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN
WASHINGTON
Clients who suffer harms as a result of their attorneys' acts, or failures
to act, may seek a remedy through common law malpractice actions
against their attorneys. 77 In Washington, a legal malpractice claim
consists of four elements: (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise
to a duty of care on the part of the attorney to the client; (2) an act or
omission by the attorney breaching the duty of care; (3) damage to the
client; and (4) proximate causation between the attorney's breach of duty
and the damages incurred. 78 Once the client establishes an attorney-
client relationship, Washington courts have clarified that the remaining
elements of a legal malpractice claim are identical to a standard
negligence claim.79
74. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
75. This provision simply maintains the status quo protections already recognized for paper files.
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
76. See POLICY, supra note 3; FAQ, supra note 8, at 2.
77. A plaintiff would also likely include the identity thief and other responsible entities as parties.
This Comment focuses on the action against the attorney because the attorney is likely the only
defendant capable of actually paying on a potential judgment. See Benner, supra note 6 (discussing
the nature of identity theft and indicating that identity thieves are not usually capable of satisfying
any potential judgment).
78. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 260, 830 P.2d 646, 651 (1992); Hansen v.
Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 88, 538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975); 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER
W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, TORT LAW & PRACTICE § 15.41, at 368 (2000).
79. See Bowman v. Doe, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 185, 704 P.2d 140, 142 (1985); Bullard v. Bailey, 91
Wash. App. 750, 755, 959 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1998).
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A. Attorneys Breach Their Duty to Clients by Failing To Act in
Accordance with the "Reasonable Attorney" Standard of Care
Legal malpractice decisions focus heavily on the standard of care that
attorneys owe their clients, and what constitutes a breach of that
standard.80 Washington courts consistently begin their decisions by
stating that the applicable standard of care is the "reasonable attorney"
standard. 81 Washington courts then address what evidence plaintiffs may
submit to demonstrate that their attorneys owed them a specific duty
under the broad reasonable attorney standard.82 Lastly, Washington
courts determine whether the harm alleged is within the general field of
harms that the specific duty was meant to protect against.
83
1. The Reasonable Attorney Standard of Care
The Washington State Supreme Court set forth the general standard of
care for attorneys in Walker v. Bangs.84 In Walker, the court held that the
standard of care required by a lawyer performing professional services in
Washington state is "'that de[g]ree of care, skill, diligence and
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful
and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction.' ' 85 This
standard of care has been repeated with little comment in several
86Washington legal malpractice cases.
80. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 260, 830 P.2d at 651; Marc R. Greenough, Note, The
Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal Malpractice Actions After Hizey v.
Carpenter, 68 WASH. L. REv. 395, 398-400 (1993).
81. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
83. Washington courts to date have not addressed the impact of foreseeability of harm as a factor
in determining the duty owed by an attorney. The only Washington legal malpractice case to focus
on foreseeability of harm was Bullard v. Bailey, which did so exclusively in the context of legal
causation. 91 Wash. App. at 759, 959 P.2d at 1127. Despite this decision, the general consensus is
that the better approach is to treat foreseeability as an aspect of whether the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty. See Rikstad v. Holmberg, 76 Wash. 2d 265, 268, 456 P.2d 355, 358 (1969);
DEWOLF & ALLEN, supra note 78, § 4.26, at 121. This general approach taken in Washington
negligence law should apply equally to legal malpractice cases. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
84. 92 Wash. 2d 854, 859, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1979).
85. See id. (quoting Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865,
867 (1968)).
86. See id.; Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 259, 830 P.2d 646, 652 (1992) (citing Hansen
v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 90, 538 P.2d 1238, 1247 (1975)).
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2. Plaintiffs Must Demonstrate That Their Attorneys Had a Specific
Duty To Refrain from the Allegedly Negligent Conduct
In addition to showing that their attorneys failed to live up to the
general reasonable attorney standard of care, plaintiffs in legal
malpractice actions must also prove that their attorneys breached a
specific duty owed to them. 87 A specific duty is a particular action that a
defendant should perform in a particular situation.88 A plaintiff proves
the attorney breached the standard of care by proving that the attorney
failed to perform a specific duty. 89 Specific duties usually relate to the
attorney's trial tactics and procedures. 90
To prove a violation of a specific duty, plaintiffs in legal malpractice
claims must first submit evidence demonstrating that the alleged duty
existed.9 1 In Hizey v. Carpenter,92 the Washington State Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs may not introduce the Rules of Professional Conduct
(RPCs) as evidence of their attorneys' duty, and that the RPCs may not
be referred to in expert testimony or jury instructions.93 The motivation
behind the court's holding was its reluctance to allow the RPCs, which
were created by judges rather than a legislative body, to establish the
87. See Rikstad, 76 Wash. 2d at 268, 456 P.2d at 357. While not a legal malpractice case, the
Rikstad decision did note the general rule that plaintiffs in negligence actions must demonstrate "a
duty upon defendant[s] to refrain from the complained-of conduct." Id.
88. See Karen J. Feyerherm, Recent Development, Legal Malpractice-Expansion of The
Standard of Care: Duty To Refer-Home v. Peckham, 56 WASH. L. REv. 505, 521 (1981)
(discussing the development of an attorney's "specific duty to refer" a client to a specialist in certain
situations); see also Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 468, 478, 951 P.2d 749,
754 (1998) (stating that a harm must not only be within a general duty to be recoverable, but that
courts must look to whether the harm was "within the general field of danger covered by the
specific duty owed by the defendant"); Raider v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 94 Wash. App. 816, 819,
975 P.2d 518, 519 (1999) (noting that while a business has a general duty to protect its invitees from
reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third parties, "the harm must lie within the general field
of danger covered by [the] specific duty owed by the defendant").
89. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. See Walker, 92 Wash. 2d at 858, 601 P.2d at 1282 (discussing the need for an expert to testify
on the specific trial techniques and procedures that should have been applied). However, not all
legal malpractice cases allege a specific duty related to the trial. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 258-60,
830 P.2d at 650-51 (discussing the scope of an attorney's duty not to enter into conflict-of-interest
transactions); Bullard v. Bailey, 91 Wash. App. 750, 759, 959 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1998) (imposing a
specific duty on an attorney to prevent his unlicensed associate from representing himself as an
attorney to the firm's clients).
91. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 259, 830 P.2d at 652 (attempting, but failing, to get the RPCs
admitted as evidence of the attorney's specific duty to the plaintiff).
92. 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646 (1992).
93. See id. at 265, 830 P.2d at 654.
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standard of care for an attorney.94 The Hizey court provided three
reasons 95 why the RPCs should not be formally admitted as evidence of
the standard of care: (1) the RPCs expressly deny creating a standard for
civil liability for lawyers; 96 (2) allowing the RPCs to serve as evidence
of specific duties owed to clients would cause attorneys to minimize the
equally important role the RPCs play in protecting the court system;
97
and (3) the RPCs cannot illuminate the specific duties of a reasonable
attorney because they outline a vague ethical scheme rather than
particular duties owed in particular situations. 98 Washington's approach
of barring the RPCs from legal malpractice actions is one of the most
extreme responses, although a majority of states impose some limit on
the use of ethical conduct rules in legal malpractice cases. 99
3. Attorneys' Duty Is Limited To Preventing Foreseeable Harms
In addition to requiring proof of the specific duty owed, Washington's
negligence law further limits the scope of a defendant's duty to the
prevention of only those harms that were foreseeable. °°  The
94. See id. at 261, 830 P.2d at 652. Despite uncertainty regarding the weight of the factors behind
the Hizey rule, Washington courts continue to impose a rigid barrier between the jury and the RPCs
based on Hizey. See Bullard, 91 Wash. App. at 759, 959 P.2d at 1127. In Washington, an expert
may quote passages from the RPCs, but must provide an independent explanation for why the
attorney's action violated a particular duty. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 265, 830 P.2d at 654. The
expert may not testify regarding whether the attorney's actions violated the RPCs, and the jury
instructions may not refer to the RPCs. See id.
95. The court's rationale is not clearly presented, but the Hizey opinion appears to offer three
reasons why the RPCs should not be admitted as evidence of an attorney's specific duty to act.
Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 258, 261-63, 830 P.2d at 650, 652-53; see infra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text. The Hizey court also noted that the RPCs are not analogous to statutes, despite
one of the plaintiff's claims to the contrary, because the Washington State Supreme Court, rather
than the legislature, created them. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 261, 830 P.2d at 652. This
observation countered one of the plaintiffs reasons why the RPCs should be admitted into evidence,
and is therefore not another reason why the RPCs should not be admitted into evidence.
96. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d. at 258, 830 P.2d at 650.
97. See id. at 263, 830 P.2d at 653.
98. See id. at 261-62, 830 P.2d at 652.
99. For examples of how other jurisdictions have addressed the role of the RPCs in legal
malpractice actions, see Wilburn Brewer Jr., Expert Witness Testimony in Legal Malpractice Cases,
45 S.C. L. REv. 727, 744-46 (1994); Greenough, supra note 80, at 398-400; and Gary A. Munneke
& Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 58-66 (1998).
100. See Rikstad v. Hokberg, 76 Wash. 2d 265, 268, 456 P.2d 355, 357 (1969); J.N. v.
Bellingham Sch. Dist., 74 Wash. App. 49, 57, 871 P.2d 1106, 1111 (1994) (recognizing that "the
duty to use reasonable care only extends to such risks of harm as are foreseeable").
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Washington State Supreme Court established this requirement in Rikstad
v. Hokberg,'0 1 a case involving a defendant who drove his truck over the
plaintiff, who was passed out in a field of tall grass. 10 2 The Rikstad court
rejected the appellate court's approach, which considered the
foreseeability of harm under the element of proximate causation. 10 3 The
court instead looked to the foreseeability of the harm to define the scope
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.10 4 The Rikstad court held that, for
there to be a duty, the harm that occurs does not have to be one that was
specifically anticipated, but must only have been within the general field
of dangers that could be foreseen by a reasonable person.'0 5 Applying
this approach, the court found that the risk of the plaintiff being run over
while passed out in the field was within the general field of dangers
covered by the defendant's duty to use reasonable care while driving a
vehicle. 106
The general field of danger encompasses a broad range of harms;
harms fall outside this scope only if "by no flight of the imagination"
could they be foreseen. 10 7 It does not matter that the harm was bizarre or
that it came about as a result of a highly improbable sequence of
events. 10 8 It is also inconsequential that the harm could have happened
earlier, but did not. For example, in Palin v. General Construction
Co.,' 0 9 the defendant argued that because oil could have previously been
released from unsecured valves on a storage tank, but had never been
before, the eventual release of the oil was not foreseeable. 1° The court
rejected this argument, holding that the fact that the oil spill could have
occurred earlier did not mean that it was not foreseeable that the oil
101. 76 Wash. 2d 265, 456 P.2d 355 (1969).
102. See id. at 268, 456 P.2d at 357.
103. See id. at 268, 456 P.2d at 357-58.
104. See id.; see also Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 798, 698 P.2d 77, 83-84 (1985)
(discussing how the question of foresceability is properly addressed under the element of duty, but
is often mistakenly addressed under the element of proximate cause).
105. See Rikstad, 76 Wash. 2d at 268,456 P.2d at 357-58.
106. See id.
107. See McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 322, 255 P.2d 360, 364 (1953)
(using example of when a neighbor shooting a baby sitter was found unforeseeable because it was
most unusual, and the employer was therefore found not to have had a duty to protect against this
harm).
108. See id.
109. 47 Wash. 2d 246, 287 P.2d 325 (1955).
110. See id. at 250, 287 P.2d at 327.
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would spill eventually.' 11 There is no firm rule determining the scope of
the field of danger; rather, the field's outer limits depend on the facts of
each case.
B. There Must Be a Causal Link Between the Attorney's Breach of a
Specific Duty and the Client's Harms
Establishing the causal link between the attorney's breach of duty and
the harm suffered by the client is often the most difficult part of a legal
malpractice claim." 12 To be held liable for the client's harm, the attorney
must be the proximate cause of the harm. Proving that the attorney was
the proximate cause requires that the client show that the attorney was
both the cause in fact of the harm, and the legal cause of the harm." 3
1. A Plaintiff Proves the Factual Link by Satisfying the "But For"
Test
In Washington legal malpractice cases, the cause in fact test is
satisfied if the harm would not have happened "but for" the attorney's
negligence." 4 Under this standard, the client must prove that the
attorney's act "more likely than not" caused the client's harm through a
direct, unbroken sequence of events that would not have occurred
without the attorney's act. 1 5 Cause in fact is generally for the trier of
fact to decide, based upon the court's instructions on how the "but for"
standard is to be applied to the facts. 116
111. Seeid.
112. See Polly A. Lord, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479, 1480
(1986).
113. See Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 257, 704 P.2d 600, 603 (1985); see also City of
Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 947 P.2d 223, 227 (1997) (recognizing that "proximate
cause consists of two elements: cause in fact and legal causation").
114. See Daugert, 104 Wash. 2d at 257, 704 P.2d at 603; Lord, supra note 112, at 1480. Cause in
fact is generally a question for the jury unless only one reasonable result is possible. See Bullard v.
Bailey, 91 Wash. App. 750, 757, 959 P.2d 1122, 1126 (1998).
115. See Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265, 282, 979 P.2d 400, 410 (1999).
116. See Daugert, 104 Wash. 2d at 257-58, 704 P.2d at 603; Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768,
778, 698 P.2d 77, 83 (1985) (stating that "cause in fact is generally left to the jury" and that "such
questions of fact are not appropriately determined on summary judgment unless but one reasonable
conclusion is possible").
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2. Legal Causation Depends Primarily on Judicial Policy and
Whether Defendant's Act Actually Increased Plaintiff's Risk of
Harm
Legal causation represents the determination that, as a matter of law,
the defendant's action was a cause of the plaintiffs injury.' 1 7 The test for
proving that the attorney was the legal cause of the client's harm is more
ambiguous than the test for proving that the attorney was the cause in
fact of the client's harm.'1 8 When deciding whether the attorney was the
legal cause of the client's harm, courts examine the facts of the case to
determine 'whether, as a matter of policy, the connection between the
ultimate result and the act of the defendant is too remote or insubstantial
to impose liability.""'1 9 As part of making this policy determination,
courts ask two questions: (1) did the defendant's act increase the risk of
the harm occurring, rather than triggering the harm by mere chance; and
(2) was the harm caused by a substantial and unforeseeable intervening
action.1 20 In addition to these two questions, courts must also consider
any other relevant factors affecting whether, as a matter of policy,
liability should follow from the defendant's action.' 2' The Washington
Pattern Jury Instructions' definition of proximate causation requires that
the plaintiff show that his injury occurred "in a direct sequence,
unbroken by any new independent cause."' 122 The jury decides the
question of legal causation as a component of the overall element of
proximate causation.' 23 Nevertheless, the element of legal causation is
117. See Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143 Wash. 2d 190, 203, 15 P.3d 1283, 1289
(2001); Bullard, 91 Wash. App. at 759, 959 P.2d at 1127.
118. Almost all prior legal malpractice cases have focused on determining whether the attorney's
action during trial was the cause in fact of an unfavorable outcome during the trial. There is only
one legal malpractice case clearly focusing on the issue of legal causation. See Bullard, 91 Wash.
App. at 759, 959 P.2d at 1127.
119. Kim, 143 Wash. 2d at 204, 15 P.3d at 1289 (quoting Tyner v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.,
141 Wash. 2d 68, 82, 1 P.3d 1148, 1155-56 (2000) (internal citation omitted)); see City of Seattle v.
Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243, 252, 947 P.2d 223, 227 (1997). Legal causation is ultimately a question
of law for the court to decide, see Kim, 143 Wash. 2d at 203, 15 P.3d at 1289, though the jury may
be called upon to make factual determinations on issues such as foreseeability, see Greenleaf v.
Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wash. 2d 647, 654, 364 P.2d 796, 802 (1961).
120. See DEWOLF & ALLEN, supra note 78, § 4.21, at 115.
121. See King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 250, 525 P.2d 228, 234 (1974).
122. 6 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PRACTICE,
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 15.01, at 179 (2002); see also id. § 15.04, at
189, § 15.05, at 191.
123. See Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 778, 698 P.2d 77, 83-84 (1985) (recognizing that
while cause in fact is entirely a jury issue, the jury's role in determining legal causation is limited to
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generally more of an obstacle for plaintiffs in the realm of summary
judgment or motions for judgment not withstanding the verdict, where
the court will be called upon to make a specific determination regarding
legal causation. 124
Bullard v. Bailey125 is the only legal malpractice case in Washington
that focuses on the question of whether the defendant's action increased
the risk of the harm occurring to the plaintiff.126 In that case, Bailey, the
defendant-attorney, had an unlicensed business associate who held
himself out as an attorney and eventually stole the settlement funds
belonging to Bailey's client. 127 Bailey failed to take steps to correct his
associate's representations. 128 Division One of the Washington State
Court of Appeals held that Bailey's failure to act increased the risk that
his client would lose his settlement funds. 129 Because the unlicensed
associate was having financial difficulties, the court decided that it was
not mere chance that the client lost his settlement funds. 130 Therefore,
the court held that, as a matter of policy, it was proper to hold Bailey
liable for his client's lOSS.
13 1
While no Washington court has addressed the issue of intervening
causation in a legal malpractice case, many courts have addressed it in
general negligence cases. Under Washington tort law, an intervening act
can persuade the court to find that the defendant's act was not the legal
cause of the plaintiffs harm if the intervening act was unforeseeable.
132
resolving issues of fact); Brust v. Newton, 70 Wash. App. 286, 290-91, 852 P.2d 1092, 1094
(1993).
124. See Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 779, 698 P.2d at 83 (in reviewing motion for summary
judgment the court distinguished between cause in fact as a primarily jury question and legal
causation that requires "a determination of whether liability should attach as a matter of law given
the existence of cause in fact"); King, 84 Wash. 2d at 250, 525 P.2d at 234 (1974) (stating that the
"court still must adduce from the record whether, as a policy of law, legal liability should attach to
the defendant if the other factual elements are proven").
125. 91 Wash. App. 750, 959 P.2d 1122 (1998).
126. While it is the only case discussing the issue of legal causation, the opinion heavily
intermingled its discussion on the scope of the duty, the defendant's responsibility for increasing the
risk of harm, and the question of whether there was a superseding cause. See, e.g., id. at 755-59,
959 P.2d at 1125-27. As a result, the case is better suited for illustrative uses than actual legal
authority on any of these issues.





132. See id. at 758-59, 959 P.2d at 1127; DEWOLF & ALLEN, supra note 78, § 4.23, at 117.
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An intervening act is foreseeable and will not sever liability if it was one
of the hazards that made the defendant's act negligent. An intervening
act can be negligent or criminal. 3 3 However, Washington courts have
held that the negligence or criminality of the intervening act is not itself
determinative, but only one factor to be considered in deciding whether
the act was foreseeable.'
34
In McLeod v. Grant County School District,'35 the Washington State
Supreme Court held that intervening acts are unforeseeable only if their
occurrence is "so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly
beyond the range of expectability."'' 36 In McLeod, the school negligently
left a darkened room under bleachers in the school's gymnasium
unlocked.137 During gym class, three male students took one of their
female classmates into this room and sexually assaulted her.'38 The
school district argued that the harm suffered by the girl was not a
foreseeable result of the school leaving the darkened room unlocked.
139
The district maintained that the sexual assault should break the causal
chain between the school's negligence and the female student's harm
because it was a crime that could not reasonably have been foreseen. 140
Applying this standard, the court decided that the male students' sexual
assault was foreseeable because the district could have foreseen the
increased likelihood that some act of indecency would take place in such
a location.' 4 1 Thus, the sexual assault did not prevent the school's
negligent act from being a legal cause of the girl's harm. 142
133. See Palin v. Gen. Constr. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 246, 250, 287 P.2d 325, 327 (1955) (noting that
"an intervening criminal act may be found to be reasonably foreseeable and, if so, liability may be
predicated thereon," and holding that oil tank owner could recover against construction company for
lost oil despite intervening act of someone else opening tank release valve).
134. See J.N. v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 74 Wash. App. 49, 58, 871 P.2d 1106, 1112 (1994).
135. 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
136. See id. at 323, 255 P.2d at 364 (citing Berglund v. Spokane County, 4 Wash. 2d 309, 103
P.2d 355 (1940)).
137. See id. at 317, 255 P.2d at 361.
138. See id. at 318, 255 P.2d at 361.
139. See id. at 319, 255 P.2d at 362.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 322-25, 255 P.2d at 363-65.
142. See id.
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IV. ATTORNEYS WHO FAIL TO REDACT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE POLICY SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE IF CLIENTS' IDENTITIES ARE STOLEN
The Policy's redaction provision is a substantial step towards
protecting clients' identities, but it may only truly be effective if it is
backed by the possibility of a cause of action against those who fail to
abide by it. The ability to pursue a legal malpractice action would
provide this effect. Clients face three hurdles to bringing this kind of
malpractice claim successfully against their attorneys. First, they must
convince courts to accept the Policy as evidence of a specific duty that
attorneys owe to clients to redact sensitive information. 43 Second, they
must further show that this duty encompasses the harms resulting from
identity theft. 44 Finally, clients must establish that their attorneys'
breach of the duty to redact proximately caused the harms resulting from
the loss of their identities.145 Under existing Washington malpractice
precedent, clients should be able to overcome all three obstacles.
A. A Malpractice Action Is Necessary Because the Policy Does Not
Provide an Enforcement Mechanism
The federal courts' rapid implementation of electronic access to court
records endangers clients by exposing litigants' personal information to
identity theft. 146 Identity thieves can use this information to steal clients'
identities, plunder their financial accounts, and rack up bad debt in
clients' names. 47 Today, the Policy is the only protection that clients
have against identity theft.' 48 Yet, standing alone, it insufficiently
safeguards clients' identities. At best, the Policy merely reminds courts
and attorneys to look after litigants' interests before making sensitive
information available electronically. 49 Unfortunately, the Policy does
not expressly protect clients once their personal information has already
been stolen. It may be difficult, if not highly unlikely, for clients to
collect from the thieves who stole their identities given the transitory
143. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 112-42 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
427
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nature and economic recourses of identity thieves.' 50 Therefore, to make
themselves whole, clients should sue their attorneys for malpractice
when these attorneys fail to redact personal information from documents
before filing those documents with the court.
B. The Policy Is Evidence That Attorneys Have a Duty To Redact
Their Clients' Personal Information Before Filing Documents with
the Court
The Policy requires that attorneys redact their clients' personal
information from documents before filing those documents with the
court. 15' Thus, the Policy provides evidence that redaction is a specific
duty that attorneys owe their clients. Whether Washington courts will
accept the Policy into evidence depends on their interpretation of the
reach of the Washington State Supreme Court's decision in Hizey v.
Carpenter. The Hizey decision prohibits clients from using the RPCs as
evidence of their attorneys' specific duties, 152 and could also be read to
prohibit the use of the Policy as evidence of the duty to redact. Both the
RPCs and the Policy were products of judicial policymaking rather than
legislative enactment, and Washington courts might be asked to focus on
the origin of the Policy rather than the specific rationales that supported
the outcome in Hizey. However, if Washington courts look beyond the
origin of the documents, they will see that the three justifications
supporting the Hizey court's exclusion of the RPCs do not support
exclusion of the Policy. After evaluating the rationales provided in
Hizey, Washington courts should allow clients to submit the Policy as
evidence of attorneys' specific duty to redact clients' personal
information from documents before filing those documents with the
court.
1. The Policy Leaves Open the Possibility of Its Use To Support
Existing Causes ofAction
The Hizey court's first rationale for rejecting the RPCs as proof of
attorneys' specific duties was that the RPCs expressly deny establishing
any specific "standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional
150. See supra note 6.
151. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
152. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 265-66, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (1992).
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conduct.' 53 The Policy, on the other hand, does not expressly preclude
clients from using it to demonstrate their attorneys' specific duties.
Because a cause of action for legal malpractice already exists, clients
will only use the Policy to prove a specific duty owed to them, not to
create a private cause of action. The Policy does not expressly preclude
clients from such a use. Therefore, the first Hizey factor does not bar use
of the Policy as evidence of the attorneys' duty.
2. The Policy's Redaction Provision Protects Only Clients, Not
Courts
The second reason the Hizey court gave for rejecting admission of the
RPCs was that they reflect mixed, and at times conflicting, public and
private obligations for attorneys. 154 The court found that the RPCs, as
adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court, were designed
primarily to protect the integrity of the judicial system, with the rights of
individual clients being of lesser concern. 55 The Hizey court feared that
allowing the RPCs into evidence would encourage attorneys to interpret
the RPCs primarily as protecting clients, minimizing the role that the
RPCs play in maintaining the integrity of the court system. 56 While it is
true that the Policy, like the RPCs, protects the integrity of the judicial
system, it does so by calling on the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions
against attorneys who fail to manage their court filings carefully. 157 The
Rule 11 provision is a distinct part of the Policy, and unrelated to the
duty of attorneys to redact their own clients' information. This type of
distinction could not be as readily made between the RPCs' court
protections and client protections, since as the Hizey court noted, all of
the RPCs' provisions are designed to remind attorneys "that their first
loyalty is to the court." 158 Because the Policy's protections for the
system and for the individual do not conflict with each other, the Hizey
decision should not bar use of the Policy as evidence of attorneys' duty
to redact.
153. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 258, 830 P.2d at 650; supra note 96 and accompanying text.
154. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 263, 830 P.2d at 653; text accompanying supra note 97.
155. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 263, 830 P.2d at 653; text accompanying supra note 97.
156. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 263, 830 P.2d at 652-53.
157. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
158. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 263, 830 P.2d at 653 (citing Jean E. Faure & R. Keith Strong,
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No Standard for Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363,
375 (1986)).
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3. The Policy's Mechanical Duty To Redact Is Well Suited to Being
Used as Evidence of a Specific Duty
Finally, the Hizey court raised concerns about the fact that the RPCs
describe only general obligations without stating particular duties owed
to clients.159 The court emphasized that the RPCs represent a vague
scheme for evaluating attorneys' ethical responsibilities to both their
clients and the court.160 For example, the court pointed to several
sections of the RPCs that require attorneys to avoid conflicts of interest
without specifying how. 161 The court rejected the RPCs' ethical scheme
as too vague to establish duties owed to clients in particular cases. 162 In
contrast, the Policy calls on attorneys to take a specific action-
redaction of four types of personal information-in order to protect their
clients. 163 Unlike the RPCs, there is much less subjectivity involved in
the Policy's requirement to redact specifically defined types of
information. Therefore, under Hizey, the Policy is appropriate evidence
of a specific duty.
C. Identity Theft Is a Foreseeable Harm Within the General Field of
Danger Contemplated by the Duty To Redact
In order to prove that the attorney committed malpractice, the
plaintiff-client must establish not only that the attorney breached a
specific duty, but also that the harm resulting from that breach was
within the general field of danger contemplated by the duty.' 64 Clients
should be able to demonstrate that the harms resulting from identity theft
are within the general field of danger that the duty to redact was
designed to protect against. For a harm to be within the general field of
danger, it must be foreseeable, 65 such as the client's loss of funds in
Bullard,166 or the injuries to the plaintiff sleeping in the long grass in
Rikstad. 1
67
159. See id.; text accompanying supra note 98.
160. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 263, 830 P.2d at 652; text accompanying supra note 98.
161. See Hizey, 119 Wash. 2d at 258, 830 P.2d at 650.
162. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 100-11.
165. See supra notes 100-11.
166. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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The widespread and public discussion on the risk of identity theft
should include the harms resulting from identity theft in the realm of
events within the "flight of the imagination"' 168 of a reasonable attorney.
The harm resulting from loss of identity is foreseeable for three reasons.
First, identity theft is a major crime 169 that has received widespread
attention. 170 Second, critics of the Policy have already predicted that
thieves would use information from court records to steal clients'
identities. 17' Third, the Policy recognizes that attorneys will have to
protect their clients from the risks associated with making court filings
available electronically, including the risk that identity thieves will comb
those filings for clients' personal information.
72
Nevertheless, some defendants might argue that the harms resulting
from identity theft are not foreseeable because there have been few
problems with electronic access thus far. 173 This argument is not likely
to succeed, however, because Washington precedent holds that the fact
that a specific harm could have occurred earlier, but did not, is
insufficient to make the eventual harm unforeseeable. 174 Therefore,
clients should be able to establish that harms resulting from identity theft
are within the general field of danger encompassed by the duty to redact.
D. Clients Should Be Able To Prove That the Failure To Redact Was
the Proximate Cause of the Harm Suffered as a Result of Identity
Loss
Once clients demonstrate that their attorneys owed them a duty to
redact their personal information from court filings, and that the duty to
redact protects against the harms resulting from identity theft, they must
still prove that their attorneys' negligence caused them to suffer those
harms. 175 The element of causation has long been recognized as the most
formidable obstacle in a legal malpractice claim because even the most
168. See McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 322, 255 P.2d 360, 364 (1953);
text accompanying supra note 107.
169. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 41.
171. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3.13; Givens, supra note 6.
172. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3.13; Givens, supra note 6.
173. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
174. See Palin v. Gen. Constr. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 246, 250, 287 P.2d 325, 327 (1955) (holding that
the fact that the oil spill could have occurred earlier did not mean that it was not foreseeable that the
oil would spill eventually).
175. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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egregious breach of duty has no legal consequence without proof of
causation. 176 To establish causation, clients must first show that their
attorneys' actions were the cause in fact of their harm. 177 Then, they
must prove that their attorneys' actions were the legal cause of their
harm. 1
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1. The Simpler Test for Cause in Fact
To establish that their attorneys were the cause in fact of their harm,
clients must prove that their attorneys' failure to redact triggered a direct
and unbroken sequence of events that would not have occurred but for
the attorneys' negligence.' 79 It is likely that triers of fact will find that
attorneys who fail to redact are the cause in fact of the harms resulting
from identity loss when the thief used information contained in court
records. Clients will likely need to obtain information tying the thief to
the PACER system in order to show that their loss occurred because of
the opportunity created by the attorneys' failure to redact, rather than
through some other means for the thief to obtain their information.'80
Proving that the thief obtained the client's information from court
records should be assisted by the PACER system's ability to track who
has viewed specific filings.
181
In sum, because stealing identities is a crime of opportunity, 182 a jury
could reasonably view an attorney's failure to redact as creating the
opportunity for an identity thief to assume the client's identity. Without
the attorney failing to redact, there would be no chain of events leading
to the client suffering harm from a lost identity. Thus, the attorney's
failure to redact is a cause in fact of the client's harm.
176. See Lord, supra note 112, at 1480.
177. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
179. See Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265, 282-83, 979 P.2d 400, 410 (1999).
180. This Comment assumes the client will be able to demonstrate that the thief obtained the
personal information through the unredacted court records. Although this may be a difficult task, the
PACER system has been set up so that the use of a login identity will allow courts to maintain "an
electronic trail which can be retraced in order to determine who accessed certain information if a
problem arises." See POLICY, supra note 3.
181. See id.
182. See Givens, supra note 6.
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2. Establishing Legal Causation: Failing To Redact Increases the
Risk of Identity Theft
In order to prove that their attorneys were the legal cause of the harms
resulting from their lost identity, clients must show that their attorneys'
actions increased the risk of the harms happening, and that those harms
were not the result of an intervening act. 183 Proving that an attorney's
action increased the risk of identity theft should not be difficult. In
Bullard, the court held that the attorney's failure to supervise his
associate increased the client's risk of losing his settlement money
because the associate was having financial difficulties and should not
have been given the opportunity to steal the client's funds. 184 Because
identity theft is also a crime of opportunity,' 85 attorneys who fail to
redact their clients' personal information from court filings similarly
increase the risk of harm to their clients by giving thieves the chance to
steal their clients' identities. Furthermore, the existence of the special
redaction protection to prevent identity theft should weigh heavily in
favor of finding that an attorney's failure to abide by the protective
measure resulted in an increased risk of the harm it was meant to protect
against. That an identity thief might use PACER records to obtain
information was the type of concern that prompted the creation of the
Policy and the impetus behind the requirement that a password be
obtained before accessing PACER is allowed. 186 Because the Judicial
Conference Committee created the redaction protection in part to
prevent court records from assisting in crimes like identity theft, 187 when
identity theft based on failure to redact occurs, it would be difficult to
argue that the theft occurred by mere chance.
Once clients establish that their attorneys' failure to redact increased
their risk of suffering harm, they must be prepared to respond to the
argument that identity thieves are intervening actors who break the
causal chain between the attorneys' negligent failure to redact and the
clients' harms. 188 An intervening act, even if criminal, will only sever
183. See supra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
184. See Bullard v. Bailey, 91 Wash. App. 750, 758-59, 959 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1998); supra note
131 and accompanying text.
185. See Givens, supra note 6.
186. See POLICY, supra note 3; text accompanying supra note 36.
187. See also FAQ, supra note 8, at 2.
188. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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legal causation if it was unforeseeable.189 To be unforeseeable, the
intervening act must be "so improbable or exceptional as to be wholly
unexpected."' 90
As shown above, the harms resulting from identity theft are
foreseeable. Further, because the act of identity theft is the only way for
the harms resulting from identity theft to occur,' 9' the act of identity
theft is also foreseeable. The intervening act's status as a crime only
relates to whether it was foreseeable,' 92 and because this crime is not
wholly unexpected, its criminal nature is not relevant. Therefore, any
argument that identity theft is an unforeseeable intervening act should
fail.
Furthermore, holding attorneys liable for the harms resulting from
identity theft is sound judicial policy based on the catch-all rule allowing
courts to look at any other relevant factors.' 93 First, a legal malpractice
claim is likely the only meaningful recourse available to clients who lose
their identities due to their attorneys' negligence.' 94 Second, the threat of
malpractice liability may be an effective means of proactively inducing
attorneys to protect their clients' interest when filing court materials.'
95
In addition, a major implication of failing to find foreseeability would be
that, despite vocal concerns prior to cases of identity theft actually
occurring, the first victims of identity theft would be forced to bear their
losses simply because they were first. Finally, in terms of efficient risk
management, the attorney as the skilled professional is likely the best
party to bear the burden of ensuring that personal information is omitted
from documents filed by the attorney. Given the potentially severe
impact from denying legal cause as a matter of policy, combined with
the attorney's status as the better risk avoider, strong policy justifications
exist for recognizing legal cause in failure to redact cases.
189. See supra notes 133-34, 136 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
191. See Benner, supra note 6; Givens, supra note 6. Furthermore, identities are inanimate
objects and do not steal themselves.
192. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
194. See Benner, supra note 6; Givens, supra note 6.
195. See Scott Peterson, Comment, Extending Legal Malpractice Liability to Nonclients-The
Washington Supreme Court Considers the Privity Requirement-Bowman v. John Doe Two, 61
WASH. L. REv. 761, 768 (1986) (noting that a purpose of negligence law is to deter culpable
behavior, and applying this concept to legal malpractice); see also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d 483, 496 (1983) (recognizing the deterrent purpose of negligence law
in the context of medical malpractice).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Policy attempts to provide users of the judicial system substantial
benefits through electronic access to court records. By reasonably
interpreting existing legal malpractice precedent, Washington courts can
ensure that these benefits are not achieved at clients' expense.
Washington clients can be effectively protected under the Policy as long
as the Washington courts are willing to adapt legal malpractice law to
the new reality of electronic access to court records. A reasonable
development of existing legal malpractice law can help to 'ensure that
clients have some effective recourse when their attorneys fail to
adequately protect them. Washington courts should admit the Policy as
evidence of an attorney's specific duty of care and recognize proximate
causation in legal malpractice cases stemming from an attorney's failure
to redact as required by the Policy.
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